Abstract. This paper considers a sequence of discrete-time random walk markets with a safe and a single risky investment opportunity, and gives conditions for the existence of arbitrages or free lunches with vanishing risk, of the form of waiting to buy and selling the next period, with no shorting, and furthermore for weak convergence of the random walk to a Gaussian continuous-time stochastic process. The conditions are given in terms of the kernel representation with respect to ordinary Brownian motion and the discretisation chosen. Arbitrage and free lunch with vanishing risk examples are established where the continuous-time analogue is arbitrage-free under small transaction costs -including for the semimartingale modifications of fractional Brownian motion suggested in the seminal Rogers (1997) article proving arbitrage in fBm models.
Introduction
If a continuous-time model for a financial market is discretised in time, will then the discretised version inherit its properties when it comes to free lunches, or absence of such? Asking the converse question: if a continuoustime model is the weak limit -"weak" because this topology gives neighbouring profits/loss process distributions for a given strategy -of a sequence of discrete-time models, will free lunch properties or no free lunch properties carry over the limit transition?
There is actually no guarantee that this will be the case. In Shiryaev's book (1999, sec. VI.3) , there are given stronger sufficient conditions for convergence to fair prices in terms of weak convergence of the (driving noise, pricing kernel) pair. This paper will show that if this joint convergence fails, then there is a wide range of problems where the arbitrage properties differ between the discretised prices and their weak limits, even when small transaction costs are introduced to the former. This author's initial interest in the problem at hand, emerges from a work by Sottinen (2001) , who establishes a sequence of discrete-time binary symmetric random walk (semimartingale) markets, which (a) converges weakly to a Black-Scholes market with prices being geometric fractional Brownian motion with Hurst parameter H > 1/2, and (b) admits an arbitrage obtained by waiting for the right moment to buy (if nonnegative drift) or short sell (if non-positive drift) the stock, and unwinding the position the very next period; the "right moment" is of course when you might with probability one know that the stock market beats the money market even if tomorrow is a bad day (in which case you buy), or waiting for the conversely adverse stock market (in which case you short-sell). Now fractional Brownian motion is not a semimartingale, and as is well known since Rogers (1997) (for the positively autocorrelated parameter range), it will introduce arbitrages to canonical models where the ordinary Brownian motion does not. In view of this, there seems to have been a view that the result of Sottinen (2001) is due to specifics of the fBm, or at least its non-semimartingale property, and this author admits to having fallen prey to this interpretation, whichas we shall see -is inaccurate.
This paper sets out to show that the phenomenon discovered by Sottinen (2001) , is to be expected way more generally, including in the discretisation of arbitrage-free semimartingale price processes. As an example, we refer to Rogers (1997) , who also proposes a parametrised semimartingale process whose moving average kernel converges to the fBm's -preserving the long memory which was the reason for suggesting fBm as a driving noise in the first place, but eliminating the short memory which caused the arbitrage. It turns out that when attempting to discretise in a manner akin to the construction of Sottinen (2001) , the long memory will introduce arbitrages, and the arbitrage property is robust enough to withstand even the introduction of a small transaction cost. It is then essential that the discretised version has bounded downside (cf. the results of Guasoni (2006) , Guasoni et al. (2008) ). A different example, admitting free lunch with vanishing risk (FLVR) in the discretisation, is the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
We shall on one hand give sufficient conditions for the existence of arbitrage or FLVR of the form (i) wait for a possible time to buy, and then (ii) sell next period. On the other, we give sufficient conditions for weak convergence of the discrete random walks to the Gaussian continuous-time counterparts. Because the results concerning arbitrages will require bounded innovations in the random walks, the weak convergence result (Theorem 2.2) will also be restricted to this case. Our main contributions compared to the previous literature (primarily Sottinen (2001) ), are summarised as follows:
• We cover a fairly general class of Gaussian processes, and give examples to the existence of arbitrages/FLVRs of the above-mentioned form.
• Furthermore, we point out that the arbitrage for discretised fBm can emerge from the (originally desirable) long-run memory of the process, even if the short-run memory (which causes the arbitrage in the continuous-time model) is modified as to obtain the semimartingale property, e.g. as suggested by Rogers (1997) .
• We cover any negative drift term (a word which should be interpreted cautiously for non-semimartingales) without shorting, as it turns out that the instantaneous growth from the noise term can tend to infinity.
• For the same reason the arbitrage may also admit sufficiently small transaction costs.
• We do not have to assume the discretised market to be binary (hence complete if arbitrage-free) with symmetric innovations. We will however assume bounded support, where the bound might depend on how fine the discretisation.
• Weak convergence of the driving noise is likewise shown in this more general setting.
The continuous-time and discrete-time market models
Our market has one "safe" asset, taken as numéraire and normalised to price = 1, and one "risky" asset S (n) , which for each n is a discretisation of a continuously evolving stochastic process S. S will be constructed from a drift process A with time-derivative a(t) and a driving noise Z, assumed to be a Gaussian moving average process with right-continuous sample paths and an adapted (hence upper limit of integration is t) kernel representation with respect to standard Brownian motion W , where K is a given function satisfying the following properties:
K is deterministic and piecewise-continuous, (2.2a)
We assume that the agent enters the market at a given time t 0 ≥ 0.
Notice that (2.2c) follows from the assumed Gaussian distribution, as the expression is in fact E[(Z(t)) 2 ]. Notice also that some representations involve K with a definition split in order to achieve square integrability, compensating the distant past. A frequently occurring representation form (cf. e.g. Cheridito (2004) ) is K(t, s) = κ(t − s) − κ(−s), and under the assumption that the kernel vanishes for s ≥ t, then we have κ(−s) = 0 for s ≥ 0. We shall later give particular attention to such a form of the type K(t, s) = κ((t−s) + ) for t > s > t 0 , where we not need to specify the definition below t 0 .
We might choose to discretise W on the entire time line; however, J will merely enter as a drift term, and we can equally well discretise J directly. We shall choose to do the latter. Hence we start by discretising the time scale (equidistantly) in intervals of length 1/n, where for each n we define
where ⌊·⌋ is the floor function (rounding toward −∞). Then we discretise W for t > t 0 by replacing its normalised increments n 1/2 · W (s
For A we can take A(t 0 ) = 0, as we are interested in increments only; we therefore define A and its discretisation as
and finally, S and its discretisation are assumed, resp. defined, to satisfy
The canonical choice is G to be the exponential function, but we shall not need this specific property; for Proposition 3.2 we will however use convexity, and for Theorem 2.2 we shall need continuity. Except when K vanishes, the S (n) and the ξ i sequence will generate the same filtration, so the first of the following assumptions is not very restrictive:
Assumption/notation 2.1. We assume formulae (2.1) through (2.6) to hold, and furthermore:
• The filtration will be generated by the {ξ i }, so that the information at time t, is generated by {ξ i } i≤tn .
• By "step number j", we shall mean at time s (n) j . That means that the agent's first chance of trading, is not at step 0, but at prices noted at step j 0 := ⌊nt 0 ⌋. Should this lead to a singularity due to e.g. t 0 = 0, K(t, 0) = +∞, then we shall however eliminate this by assuming (without mention) that t 0 is > 0 and irrational.
• We shall use the term "j-measurable" to mean measurable at step number j, i.e. at time s (n) j , and write P j = P (n) j for the probability measure conditional on the filtration generated up to this time/step and E j = E (n) j for the corresponding conditional expectation.
• The {ξ (n) i } i,n will be mutually independent and each ξ (n) i bounded, and there exists some (common) constant ν > 0 such that ess inf ξ (n) i < −ν and ess sup ξ
• Since ξ j is independent of the past, we shall suppress the dependence of law in terms like e.g. ess sup ξ j which will denote the supremum over the (P j -)essential support of ξ j .
• Two pieces of notation: K ′ 1 shall denote the partial derivative with respect to the first variable. The symbol shall mean "no smaller than and not a.s. equal".
• a is assumed locally bounded, and G is assumed continuous and strictly increasing.
It should be remarked that it is unreasonable for an approximation to normalised standard Brownian motion that ν < 1, but only in parts of Theorems 3.7 and 3.8 shall we actually need that 0 is interior in the support. Bounded support will however be essential for the arbitrage conditions, and the following result will be simplified by assuming a common bound:
i ] = 1 and ess sup |ξ i | ≤ M < ∞ (all i, n). Then Z (n) converges weakly to Z, and for continuous G also S (n) to S, on the Skorohod space D([t 0 , T ]), every T > t 0 .
Proof. The drift and the already occurred part will represent no issue, and we can take A = A (n) = J = 0 without loss of generality. Also, we can take G to be the identity, as weak limits commute with continuous functions G. Now convergence in finite-dimensional distributions follows like in Sottinen (2001, Theorem 1) : by the CLT, the limit is Gaussian with zero mean; for the covariances, the independence of the ξ i 's yields, for
which is a Riemann sum converging to the desired value
It remains to prove tightness, which will follow by a set of sufficient conditions given in Whitt (2007, Lemma 3.11 (ii.b 
For each n, let t n be an argsup. For any subsequence of t n converging to a limit pointt, we have convergence as a Riemann sum:
which by square integrability tends to 0 as h does.
For the discrete-time markets, we shall restrict ourselves to the following set of strategies: Definition 2.3. Let n < ∞ be given. For any natural q, a "q-period strategy" ("single period strategy" if q = 1), consists of waiting until some stopping time t * = s
, buying a j * -measurable number u > 0 of units, holding these until a stopping time t * = s (n) j * where j * ∈ {j * + 1, . . . , j * + q} and then selling all u units. The "net return" from this transaction is
where λΛ * and λΛ * are the respective transaction costs for buying and selling, allowed to depend on prices and units like in Assumption 2.4 below.
The reason for the "λ" parameter is that we will consider the properties for small transaction costs, and it will be convenient to scale by a number.
The main results will be carried out under for fixed transaction costs and u = 1, and Proposition 3.2 will show that this is sufficiently general. For the time being, assume the more parsimonious form for Λ * , Λ * :
will be nonnegative functions, bounded in (S (n) (t * ), S (n) (t * ), while λ will be a number ≥ 0.
Definition 2.5. We shall use the term "transaction cost λ" to imply that u = 1 and Λ * + Λ * = 1 (identically), and we shall refer to "the simple model (2.10)" the single period case of transaction cost λ where G is the identity. This "simple model" will be the main focus. For this case, the net return on the event {j * < ∞} will be
where we introduce the notation
(2.10c)
adopting the convention that the empty sum, corresponding to j = j 0 (= ⌊nt 0 ⌋), is zero. Notice that the z step j to j + 1, and has subscript "j + 1" since it is only j + 1-measurable. The x j and y j , which correspond to the memory of the process as well as the drift a, are j-measurable. An arbitrage will occur in the market if the memory contribution dominates even in the worst-case innovation. The next section will make this more precise.
Free lunches: sufficient conditions
Starting out with the definitions from the previous section, we now define arbitrage and free lunches with vanishing risk under our admissibility conditions. Informally, we have a FLVR if we can obtain an arbitrarily small downside to mean return ratio, and an arbitrage if one can have positivemean return without downside. The arguably most natural, and also the strictest, concept of "downside" is the worst-case outcome, the essential supremum of the negative part, and we shall restrict ourselves to such a definition.
The following definition appears notationally a bit cryptic, but will under q-period strategies coincide with the conventional definition of FLVR and arbitrage; informally, it says that downside should be arbitrarily small compared to expected return (and we note that the expectation term is finite, by boundedness of the ξ i ). Note however that this diverges on the outset -though not in substance, as we shall see below -from a commonplace assumption of fixed horizon. This fixed horizon is less natural here, where the strategies involve waiting first and only then is there a bound on the holding period:
Definition 3.1. Fix n, q both < ∞. Consider the condition ess inf
• The market is said to admit free lunch with vanishing risk ("FLVR") in q periods if for every δ > 0 there exist stopping times j * ≥ j 0 and j * ∈ {j * +1, . . . , j * +q} and a j * -measurable event D j * with P j 0 [D j * ] > 0, such that (3.1) holds.
• The FLVR is called an arbitrage if the FLVR definition holds also for δ = 0. • The simple model (2.10) will be said to admit FLVR resp. arbitrage, if the respective definition applies with q = 1 (i.e. j * = j * + 1).
Whenever necessary to distinguish the ex ante (at j 0 ) random variable which is either 0 (if D j does not occur) or > 0 on one hand, from the D j -conditional positive return on the other -colloquially speaking, the lottery ticket that yields 0 from the actual positive lunch prize -we shall use terms like the "event" that the lunch "manifests itself".
Obviously, the lack of time bound makes no difference for an arbitrage; if there is an arbitrage according to this definition, then for some fixed Q, there is an arbitrage which is closed out within Q steps, i.e., j * ≤ Q. Conversely, it does not matter that q is assumed deterministic; had we employed the same definition except with q being merely measureable and finite, we would have had an arbitrage for some deterministic q as well. The FLVR definition, on the other hand, might require an unbounded j * . Informally, a FLVR is a sequence of lunches with uniformly positive mean, but where the risk tends to zero. This means that for any nonzero downside you choose as tolerance, then there is a fixed Q such that you have a lunch within your risk tolerance within Q steps. Letting downside tend to zero, then our setup allows Q to grow, as long as q obeys a fixed bound; compare this to the usual BlackScholes setup, which rules out the strategy of trading and waiting for the unbounded stopping time until your position has made a given profit.
For the purpose of giving sufficient conditions for arbitrage/FLVR under small transaction cost -which is the main object of this section -the simple model (2.10), for which q = 1, turns out fairly close to general: Proposition 3.2 (Free lunches in the simple model (2.10) vs. in the full model). Fix u > 0, n < ∞. Assume that Λ * of at most linear growth wrt. the last variable (the selling price). Then there is an arbitrage for sufficiently small λ, provided that so is the case in the simple model (2.10). If G is convex, then there is FLVR for sufficiently small λ, provided that so is the case in the simple model (2.10).
Proof. The proof is less interesting, and is relegated to the Appendix. Notice that if ξ j K(s
j ) is upper bounded (for every j and n), then the at most linear growth condition will hold (since an arbitrage must be closed out in a bounded number of periods).
Informally, an arbitrage in the simple model (2.10), occurs if at some bounded j * ∈ [j 0 , ∞), given the information available then, the transaction costs plus the worst-case possible downside from the innovation z (n) j * +1 will be more than fully compensated by the contribution from the dependence of the past (i.e. x (n) j * +1 + y (n) j * +1 ); a FLVR occurs if it is "sufficiently more than compensated in mean" and "nearly fully compensated in worst-case". The following result is key for the arbitrage case: we have an arbitrage for all transaction costs λ ∈ [0,λ) by choosing j * = this j. Furthermore, we have arbitrage for transaction costλ if in addition there is a point probability that z j+1 attains its ess sup .
Proof. Suppose (3.2) holds for someλ. Let D j be the j-measurable event of attaining x j + y j ≥ ess sup
Should the event D j occur at step j, then (2.10a) is > 0 and so is the ess inf of (3.1), where then both numerator and denominator become positive. Arbitrage also for transaction costλ holds if we have positive probability at ǫ = 0.
So the discrete market will admit an arbitrage if there may occur a period so good that the contribution from this beneficial history, knocks out the innovation so much that the worst-case scenario is a profit. Evidently, this will not happen if K is a constant (i.e. ordinary Brownian motion), for then the history does not matter; on the other hand, if K is increasing in its first variable, then it is near-trivial to construct arbitrage examples by letting downside be bounded and the upside be unbounded. While one can certainly imagine a some modeler trying to use e.g. a shifted lognormal in order to model limited liability investments, a choice of a symmetric distribution for the ξ i would arguably be more natural and innocuous-looking. But for a suitably wide range of models, a larger downside than upside will not even prevent an arbitrage, as we shall soon see. For the book-keeping of "good" and "bad" ξ i outcomes, we shall denote their essential suprema/infima as follows:
Standing at step j, then the worst that can happen in the next innovation, cf. (2.10d), is denoted β j ("beta" for "bad"):
Looking back in time, we define γ ij ("gamma" for "good") to be the best possible history over i = j 0 , · · · , j (cf. (2.10c)):
We want to specify this in terms of time, not only steps. Suppose we are targeting an arbitrage within time T for the discretised model, choosing j * to be the second-to-last step before time T , closing out the transaction before time T :
. Consider then n −1/2 y j * and bear in mind that j * depends on n chosen as (3.5). Then, provided that limits exist (again, K ′ 1 denotes the derivative wrt. the first variable), we have
where the inequality follows from nonnegativity of the integrand and the Fatou lemma. So, given ǫ > 0, then for all large enough but finite n, there will be positive P j 0 measure of the event
This gives rise to the following result:
Theorem 3.4 (Sufficient conditions for arbitrage within time T in the simple model (2.10)). Fix a T > t 0 and for each n, let j * be given by (3.5).
Assume that at T we have J Hölder continuous with exponent α > 1/2, and furthermore that K(t, s) is differentiable in the first variable, at t = T , for each s ∈ (t 0 , T ). Then if
holds for all large enough n, someǭ > 0, then for any n large enough, there is an arbitrage with sufficiently small transaction costs, by waiting until step j * .
Proof. Under the assumptions, we would on the event in (3.6) have a net return of at least
and the Hölder regularity ensures that the first term inside the bracket (i.e. x j √ n), will vanish as n grows. Then by (3.7), the net return will for large enough n be a positive random variable, even with small transaction costs.
Remark 3.5. First, observe that if lim sրT K(T, s) = 0, then this would lead to arbitrages. Second, note that Theorem 3.4 is stated for fixed T , but it is sufficient to look for some T where it applies. For example, if ξ i have symmetric support for each n, then we can replace (3.7) by
where the sup is taken over those T > t 0 for which n(T − t 0 ) is integer. Now one can look for arbitrages by letting T grow.
Theorem 3.4 also applies to semimartingales. The corollary is stated only for the natural choice of symmetric innovations: Corollary 3.6. There are infinite-variation semimartingales Z, equalling weak limits of their discretisations Z (n) formed by i.i.d. bounded symmetric ξ i , for which Theorem 3.4 applies.
Proof. Put t 0 = 0 for simplicity. From Cheridito (2004, Theorem 3.9) , it is sufficient for the semimartingale property that K(t, s) = κ(t−s) on t > s > 0 with κ being continuous and piecewise differentiable with κ ′ ∈ L 2 ((0, ∞)), and under these conditions, total variation is infinite on compacts iff κ(0 + ) = 0. Choose a κ ≥ 0 with a global maximum at T , with κ(T ) > 2κ(0 + ) > 0; then it satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 3.4, and we only need κ(ϑ) to be smooth and κ ′ to tend sufficiently fast to 0 as to be square integrable.
The form where the dependence on (t, s) only appear through the difference, will cover many cases and simplify calculations. We introduce the conditions:
For each n, we have i-independent m i = m = m (n) and
for s ≥ t 0 , with κ not constant on (0, ∞) (3.9b)
-the non-constantness ruling out the ordinary Brownian motion. As seen above, this form covers a wide class of even semimartingales. We can then write y and z as
(3.10a)
Now consider the good outcomes γ ij ; if κ is monotone or m = M , then the series in (3.10a) will telescope. A non-monotone κ only has more variation, which increases the sum, so the ess sup of y j will therefore be at least
(if we want to utilise the variation of κ, we could write in terms as a sum of |κ ′ |-terms, tending to the constant times the total variation of κ over the interval (1/n, (j − j 0 + 1)/n).) We have the following:
Theorem 3.7 (Sufficient conditions for arbitrage in the simple model under the form (3.9)). Suppose that J is Hölder continuous with index α > 1/2 and furthermore that for some subsequence n ℓ , we have m (n ℓ ) , and M (n ℓ ) bounded. Then, each of the following conditions implies arbitrage for all large enough ℓ -and furthermore, for each of those n ℓ , the arbitrage admits small enough transaction costs:
Proof. In all cases, Hölder regularity ensures that x j √ n will tend to 0 as n grows. Then:
(a). By (3.9b), κ takes some nonzero value. Suppose first that κ(1/n ℓ ) ց 0 while κ(ϑ) > 0. Then choosing a sequence of j's so that (j − j 0 + 1)/n approximates ϑ from the appropriate side (recall that (2.2a) assumes only piecewise continuity), we obtain
The negative-sign case likewise converges to m · |κ(ϑ)|. Now suppose that κ changes sign, and by the previous part of the proof, we can assume that κ(1/n ℓ ) is bounded away from 0. Suppose that κ(1/n ℓ ) > 0 > κ(ϑ). Then choosing j as above, we obtain
which is positive whenever n ℓ is large enough. The case with reversed signs follows likewise. (b).
√ n ess sup y j exceeds min{m (n) , M (n) } × total variation on (
The Hölder regularity condition on J in Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 admits ramifications, as we need only bound the downside -it can be replaced by the condition that for each n we have x j ≥ 0 for infinitely many j, which by symmetry of W occurs in at least half of the cases (unconditionally, i.e. "P −∞ "). Should x j √ n blow up as n grows, then it would be expected that J(T, T − 1/n) oscillates around 0, and we would be able to extract a subsequence where it adds positively to the return. Similar considerations would improve upon the next Theorem 3.8 as well. Before we state that result, it should be noted that the total variation criterion can also be improved upon in the setup of Theorem 3.4, if the variation of the step function corresponding to grid size 1/n, diverges as time grows. When |κ(1/n)| → ∞, and κ is monotone (anything else improves total variation) and does not change sign (if it does, Theorem 3.4 part (a) applies), we can still have free lunches with vanishing risk:
Theorem 3.8 (Sufficient conditions for FLVR under the form (3.9)). Suppose zero transaction cost and that M (n) = m (n) and inf i E[ξ
i ]/m (n) > −1. Furthermore, assume that κ does not change sign, and that inf ϑ |κ(ϑ)| = 0 < lim inf n |κ(1/n)| (possibly = +∞)). Then either of the following is sufficient for FLVR: (a). For given n: x (n) j ≥ 0 for infinitely many j, and additionally, lim ϑ→∞ κ(ϑ) = 0. (b). J is Hölder continuous with index > 1/2, lim inf n
> −1, and n is large enough. The FLVR is an arbitrage if the positivity of the x j is uniform (wrt. j).
Proof. We prove only the case of positive κ. Just like in the proof of Theorem 3.7 part (a), √ n ess sup y j +ess inf z j+1 will telescope to −m (n) κ( j−j 0 +1 n ), which can be made arbitrarily close to 0; a P j 0 -positive event will be it falling within ǫ/n of −m (n) κ(
). It will turn out that this takes care of the numerator of (3.1) in the FLVR definition. For the denominator, we need the expected return:
(a). Now passing through a subsequence with nonnegative x j , then κ( j−j 0 +1 n ) will vanish and (3.12) will be positive from the assumption; this takes care of the denominator of (3.1). Assuming that the numerator is negative (otherwise there is arbitrage), the ratio (3.1) will on the P j 0 -positive event of the history falling within ǫ/ √ n of its ess sup, exceed
which tends to 0 as j and ǫ −1 grow. (b). The ratio (3.1) becomes -with ǫ = ǫ n possibly n-dependent -
First, cancel m/ √ n. Then, observe that as in the proof of Theorem 3.7
part (a), we can choose j depending on n as to approximate the appropriate ϑ, or possibly the appropriate sequence of ϑ's, so that κ( j−j 0 +1 n ) vanishes in the limit, along with -by assumption -everything involving x j . Then for suitably small ǫ, then κ(1/n) will make the denominator (and hence the expectation) positive, while the numerator can be chosen arbitrarily small.
Remark 3.9. Notice that the statements of Theorem 3.7 and of Theorem 3.8 part (b), do not depend on what t 0 is, and what history the agent faces upon entry. It is certainly not obvious that it should be this way. The setup of Theorem 3.4 does not rule out a priori that there could be an arbitrage initially, to be exploited at a later stage if a positive event D j occurs, but which with positive probability disappears for good. (In more formal terms, the ξ j+1 could be drawn so that not only would
for all i > j 0 .) But under the applicability of Theorem 3.7 or Theorem 3.8 part (b), this will not be the case: the arbitrage, resp. FLVR, will show up for large enough n regardless of whether the agent enters after a long "bad" period which hampers future prospects; for fine enough discretisation, there will always be a positive event where the arbitrage could materialise. This is not to say that the probability of this event is independent of history, nor that the choice of positive event is -only the binary question of existence. Under these results, regardless how disadvantageous the development has been, the strategy of calmly waiting for lunch time, will always yield positive expected value.
Some examples and non-examples
We will in the following discuss a few cases. Throughout this section, assume common symmetric support [−m, m] .
(a). Brownian motion is not prone to arbitrages in the discretised version; we have K(t, s) = 1 t>s>0 , so there is no contribution from history. (b). The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (mean-reverting to 0) admits the representation κ(ϑ) = κ(0) · e −vt with v > 0. This κ satisfies Theorem 3.8, which will yield FLVR (but, easily, not arbitrage) if choosing the distribution of the ξ i to comply with the assumptions. If there is positive drift (mean-reversion to a positive level µ), then the discretised version admits arbitrage. It should be noted though, that in the continuoustime model, a portfolio of η(t) yields a wealth process dynamics of η(t)dZ(t) = η(t)[v · (µ − Z(t)) + σdW (t) , where there is an arbitrarily big upside for given volatility level, by waiting for Z to become neg-atively large. However, the continuous model remains arbitrage-free,may be sharpened and the results likely ramified. That is in the author's opinion not a main concern. Rather, it has turned out that a type of result once interpreted as another objectional property of the fBm's, is simply to be expected if one models moving average processes in such a careless way. One could certainly try to remedy the problem by choosing wide supports with low probability of the arbitrages manifesting themselves. Arguably, a practitioner should be worried even at far less radical modeling issues than the binary existence of arbitrage, and a quick fix which merely covers up the most obvious undesirable property, might not be an adequate solution to the inherent problem.
which at least equals λ · 2(λ 0 + λ 1 S * + Λ * ) =: λΛ, whereΛ is a locally bounded function of S * alone. Hence we can consider the problem withΛ in place of Λ * and assuming Λ * = 0, and then the right-hand side of (A.1) will not depend on the selling price ζ * . We are done with the arbitrage part of the proposition.
For FLVR, it suffices to point out that Jensen's inequality improves both the upside and downside for convex G, compared to for linear ones.
